Gen. Abdul Manan Farahi has served as the director of the Afghan Interior Ministry’s Counter-Terrorism Department for the last two-and-a-half years. In an exclusive interview with EurasiaNet, Farahi surveyed Afghanistan’s security landscape, and discussed the challenges facing government forces as they strive to contain the radical Islamic insurgency.
EurasiaNet: How many people work for your department? Farahi: Not enough. I can’t elaborate on the exact number for security reasons, but I can say that we need many more people to do our job. We work closely with the international community but in the last couple of years, Afghans are becoming more responsible for fighting their own battles, while foreigners take more of a supporting role. The Afghan National Army is in charge much more, and is well trained to do so. … It’s our police force that is in most danger. They [law-enforcement officers] are also on the frontlines, and we lose 10 or more police officers everyday to acts of terrorism. The police need better training, more personnel and institutional reforms so that they can be prepared and stronger to fight.
EurasiaNet: Does your department’s power reach beyond Kabul? Farahi: Yes. We have power and representatives in every province, but there are certain districts where we have problems with corruption.
EurasiaNet: The number of terrorism acts over the last two years has dramatically risen in Afghanistan. What are the main reasons? Farahi: Yes, there has been an increase in the following areas of terrorism: suicide bombings, IEDs (improvised explosive devices designed chiefly to blow up vehicles), rocket attacks, and individual terrorist acts, such as assassinations.
The situation has gotten worse because of social, political, economic and military reasons, and it’s not that we’ve been ignoring the reality, but that we’ve had limited resources. … The world needs to look at the fundamentalist movements in the region; how are they forming and why? We need to look at the roots and goals of these groups beyond Afghanistan in order to understand Afghanistan’s security problem.
EurasiaNet: In the last six months, the number of people caught about to commit suicide bombings and other acts of violence has also increased. How have your resources and capabilities to catch would-be terrorists gotten better? Farahi: We haven’t remained still while the enemy has been active. In the last six months, we’ve captured some very strong and dangerous networks across Afghanistan, [and] 130 acts of violence were prevented. Our resources have gotten better, especially technically, because of the help that the United States and other allies have offered us, and also our officers have better salaries now through the administrative reforms that have taken place. An officer’s monthly salary was 4000 Afs ($80) a year ago and now it’s 30 to 35,000 Afs ($600 to $700). This has improved their lives so they can be motivated to work better. The Afghan leadership’s closer attention to this issue has made things better. Better training, education, intelligence, transportation are also reasons.
EurasiaNet: Where are most suicide bombers from, what nationality, and why do they do it? Farahi: There are very few Afghans. The majority are foreigners. We captured an engineer several days ago who was a Christian from Siberia but converted to Islam a few years ago and was recruited to al-Qaeda. He was trained for two years and brainwashed and then sent here to blow himself up. We caught him while under a burqa with explosive devices in a vehicle. They’re mostly Pakistanis, Chechens and a variety of other nationalities. We capture them through intelligence operations.
Poverty may be the root cause of why suicide bombers do this, but there’s more to it than that. A young boy who doesn’t have enough to eat will fall in the hands of a madrasa, but how he decides to use the training he gets cannot be attributed to poverty.
EurasiaNet: Did the recent peace jirga (assembly) do anything to improve Afghanistan’s security situation? [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp081107.shtml Farahi: It was a positive step and it opened the way to discussion and an understanding that [Afghanistan and Pakistan] need to work together. We can’t immediately feel the result, but the fact that there’s a willingness to understand each other is equally important.
EurasiaNet: What is your biggest challenge to fighting terrorism? Farahi: There are domestic challenges — such as political pressures, lack of administrative and sector reforms and corruption — and there are the international challenges of extremism in neighboring countries that export their issues here.
EurasiaNet: Is there evidence that Iran is contributing to terrorism here? Farahi: I cannot discuss this issue in detail, but Iran is our ally.
EurasiaNet: What is the best way to fight terrorism, and is that way being implemented in Afghanistan? Farahi: From what I have learned and studied through my years of military experience, 75 percent of preventing terrorism involves social and political reforms, and only 25 percent involves military and law enforcement. So we need to focus on the other areas more. We cannot just focus on bombing and killing and law enforcement.
EurasiaNet: Does the popular mood in Afghanistan today toward the presence of foreign forces differ from that which existed during the Soviet occupation? Farahi: It’s so different that it cannot be compared at all. Afghans by and large felt “invaded” by the Soviets and were ready to fight against them. … When the United States came, we were tired of war and ready for a new beginning. There was more support for international intervention.
EurasiaNet: Security has deteriorated across the country, yet the situation in the East and South differs from that in the North and West. Can you explain the security differences in various regions? Farahi: In the South and East al-Qaeda and the Taliban are causing the trouble, and in the North there are warlords and drugs lords. … Most of the funding for terrorism comes from the drug trade. We have proof of this. The narcotics grown and refined in Badakhshan are easily transported to Helmand for sale. My department is trained to understand the drug trade and those involved, but we are not directly involved in eradication or fighting the trade.